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Abstract 
Controversies often arise at the interfaces where intellectual property (“IP”) law meets 
other topics in law and economics, such as property law, contract law, and antitrust law. 
Participants in the debates over how to mediate these interfaces often view each interface as a 
special case deserving unique treatment under the law.  The doctrines of copyright and patent 
misuse are cases in point:  they graft select antitrust principles onto copyright or patent law, even 
though there is an entirely distinct body of law – antitrust law – designed to deal with the putative 
concerns about competition that allegedly give rise to misuse.  In this essay, we argue that a better 
approach for mediating disputes at the periphery of IP law focuses on what we term the “basics” – 
or core principles and features – of each area of law, and rarely requires specialized frameworks.  
For example, according to our “basics matter” approach, there is no need to create special 
doctrines or approaches to address issues relating to matters such as price discrimination or 
restrictive licensing arrangements involving IP.  Rather, analyzing the legality of such 
arrangements simply requires one to look to the basics of substantive IP law, antitrust law, and 
what some people call the “general law” – property law, contract law, and the like.  Applying the 
basics of each area of the law gives us a workable – and more predictable – framework of analysis 
than creating one-off doctrines at the periphery of the IP law that are unique to IP.  In contrast with 
more specialized approaches, such as the doctrines of copyright or patent misuse, using the basics 
results in easier to apply rules for resolving disputes that transacting parties can better understand 
and rely on in advance.  By reducing legal uncertainty, the “basics matter” approach facilitates the 
ex ante coordination necessary to promote innovation through the commercialization of the 
inventions, symbols, and creative works that are protected by patents, copyrights, and trademarks 
– the entire goal of IP law and an important goal of antitrust law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Controversies often arise at the interfaces where intellectual property 
(“IP”) law meets other topics in law and economics, such as property law, 
contract law, and antitrust law.1  Participants in the debates over how to mediate 
these interfaces often view each interface as a special case deserving unique 
treatment under the law.2  The doctrines of copyright and patent misuse are cases 
in point:  they graft select antitrust principles onto copyright or patent law, even 
though there is an entirely distinct body of law – antitrust law – designed to deal 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Symposium, The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust 
Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1695 (2003); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL, at xii (1973); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on 
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966); Louis 
Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984); 
Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (2002); 
Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001); 
Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998); Glynn S. Lunney, Copyright and the Supposed Efficiency of 
First-Degree Price Discrimination (2002) (working paper).   
2 Indeed, these debates often take on status as their own specialized disciplines bearing 
new “and-based” names, such as “intellectual property and antitrust,” which in turn spawn new 
sub-specialties, such as “copyright and antitrust.”   
(printed 12/29/2003) 
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with the putative concerns about competition that allegedly give rise to misuse.  
We argue that such specialized approaches to IP are built by selectively exalting 
and ignoring particular aspects of the positive and normative frameworks from 
distinct substantive areas of law – IP law, antitrust law, property law, and contract 
law.  Overlooking the totality of these frameworks frustrates the nuanced 
equilibria to which they have each evolved and the full compliment of important 
dynamic forces each framework experiences towards further development.3   
Instead, we argue that the better approach focuses on the “basics” – or 
core principles and features – of each area of law, and rarely requires specialized 
frameworks for IP law and the interfaces it shares with other bodies of law.  In 
short, the basics matter, to a very large extent.  The basics matter in the sense that 
they are where the analysis of any dispute or transaction involving IP should 
begin.  The basics also matter in that they are just about where the analysis should 
end.  For example, in our “basics matter” approach, there is no need to create 
special doctrines or approaches to address matters such as price discrimination or 
restrictive licensing arrangements involving IP.4  Rather, analyzing the legality of 
such arrangements simply requires one to look to the basics of substantive IP law, 
antitrust law, and what some people call the “general law” – property law, 
contract law, and the like.  Fidelity to the basics of each area of law gives us a 
workable – and more predictable – framework of analysis than creating one-off 
doctrines at the periphery of the law of IP that are unique to IP.  In contrast with 
more specialized approaches tailored for IP – such as the doctrines of copyright or 
patent misuse, which include various limitations on restrictive licensing 
arrangements beyond what the antitrust laws would prohibit – using the basics 
results in easier to apply rules for resolving disputes that transacting parties can 
better understand and rely on in advance.  By reducing legal uncertainty, the 
“basics matter” approach facilitates the ex ante coordination necessary to promote 
innovation through the commercialization of the inventions, symbols, and creative 
works that are protected by patents, copyrights, and trademarks – the entire goal 
of IP law and an important goal of antitrust law.   
                                                 
3 For earlier articulations of the views at the core of the “basics matter” approach 
developed below, see, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, 
PAULINE NEWMAN & F. SCOTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1066-1155 (2001); Troy 
Paredes, Copyright Misuse and Tying: Will Courts Stop Misusing Misuse?, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 271 
(1994).   
4 For the most influential articulation of the “basics matter” approach we explore in this 
essay, and the earliest we could find, see Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices 
and the Anti-Monopoly Laws (pts. 1-5), 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942).   
Kieff & Paredes THE BASICS MATTER: AT THE PERIPHERY OF IP 3 
We proceed in Part II to discuss the broad framework of the problem of 
ignoring the basics, using the topic of price discrimination as a representative 
example.  Part III reviews the basics of the core substantive areas of law that IP 
typically implicates:  IP law itself, as well as antitrust law and the so-called 
general law, which includes property law and contract law.  Part IV shows how to 
solve various problems at the periphery of IP law by using the basics of each 
implicated legal regime, as opposed to an approach, such as copyright or patent 
misuse, that selectively emphasizes or alternatively ignores particular features of 
various legal disciplines in crafting specialized doctrines for IP.  We argue that 
the dignity of each separate and distinct area of law can and should be respected 
and applied on its own terms to settle disputes involving IP.  By focusing on the 
basics, our approach suggests an important way to reconceptualize IP law with 
important implications for bringing new ideas to market.  Part V concludes.   
II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
IP rights generally operate as rights of exclusion.5  As a result, many 
worry that their enforcement will result in too little use of whatever they cover.  
Further, the subject matter IP rights cover is generally understood to show 
prototypical attributes of public goods in that it is nonrival and nonexclusive.  
Classic work by Demsetz, however, has shown that private producers can produce 
and sell an efficient level of public goods if they can exclude non-purchasers, and 
that price discrimination can advance a competitive equilibrium outcome for 
public goods, resulting in little, if any, deadweight loss.6  When an owner of IP 
rights is permitted to price discriminate, the owner may adopt a pricing regime 
and licensing scheme that increases output, eating into any deadweight loss 
typically associated with market power and the underproduction of public goods.7   
Yet, an IP owner’s use of price discrimination may not always lead to this 
welfare-enhancing outcome.  Recent works by Gordon, Meurer, and Lunney have 
                                                 
5 IP rights are rights to exclude others from doing something.  IP rights are not rights to 
do that something.  Their impact is more precisely viewed as being exclusionary than exclusive.  
The impact of IP rights is only properly viewed as being exclusive in those cases where the one 
exercising the right to exclude happens to be otherwise free (such as from other rights of exclusion 
or other regulations) to do the excluded activity.   
6 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354 
(1967); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970).  
For a basic overview of the economics of price discrimination, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133-68 (1997).     
7 See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 727-32 (2001).   
Kieff & Paredes THE BASICS MATTER: AT THE PERIPHERY OF IP 4 
shown that while price discrimination by IP owners can lead to more use in many 
instances, some price discrimination strategies – depending, in part, on the 
licensing arrangements employed to discriminate among users – can result in less 
output than if such price discrimination were prohibited.8  Put simply, price 
discrimination has its own shortcomings, and sometimes results in less, not more, 
use.   
The indeterminate results of price discrimination caused us to think more 
critically, and more broadly, about IP and price discrimination and ultimately 
about the interface IP law shares with other disciplines, such as antitrust law and 
the general law, including property law and contract law.  More specifically, there 
are different types and strategies of price discrimination with different potential 
consequences – both positive and negative from the perspective of social welfare.  
Price discrimination can be done by the explicit use of different stated prices, in 
the extreme case by charging each user her reservation price.  Price discrimination 
can also be done through more complex licensing arrangements, like tying, which 
can allow each user to more specifically reveal her own demand for the tying 
good by how much of the tied good she uses.  It is particularly useful to apply the 
basics to each form of price discrimination since each implicates aspects of IP 
law, antitrust law contract law, and property law.      
As discussed more fully below, approaching IP from the basics of IP law, 
antitrust law, and the general law of property and contracts enables transacting 
parties to better know ex ante how to structure transactions that will be enforced 
                                                 
8 See generally Gordon, supra note 1; Lunney, supra note 1; Meurer, supra note 1.  For 
more on the debate over the impact of imperfect price discrimination on output, see Richard A. 
Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 933 n.10 (2001):  
Perfect price discrimination would bring about the same output as under 
competition, because no customer willing to pay the seller’s marginal cost 
would be turned away. But perfect price discrimination is infeasible, and 
imperfect price discrimination can result in a lower or higher output than under 
competition, or the same output.  See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE 494-96 (3d ed. 1990); PAUL A. 
SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 42-45 (1947); JOAN 
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 188-95 (1933).  Many 
economists believe that even crude discrimination is more likely to expand than 
to reduce output,  see, e.g., ROBINSON, supra, at 201; SCHERER & ROSS, supra, 
at 494-96; Peter O. Steiner, Book Review, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 882 (1977), 
but there does not appear to be a firm basis for this belief.  See Hal R. Varian, 
Price Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 597, 
629-33 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
Id. 
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later.  For example, when a court limits its analysis to applying the basics of each 
body of law, there is less opportunity for courts to fashion new and unique 
doctrines at the periphery of IP law that undercut private ordering by effectively 
rewriting ex post the parties’ contract, let alone the legislature’s actions.  Courts 
are ill-equipped to second-guess the substance of contracts entered into by 
sophisticated parties merely because the courts believe that some different 
arrangement would better promote the use of the underlying IP rights.  Such 
judicial meddling is particularly troublesome when its downstream incentive 
effects on parties – including owners of IP rights and financiers, such as venture 
capitalists – are taken into account.  In addition to creating uncertainty, 
specialized doctrines such as misuse more times than not uniquely disadvantage 
the holder of IP.  These doctrines often have the effect of eroding the legislatively 
created property rule protection for IP rights, further compromising 
commercialization and private ordering by cabining an IP holder’s rights both to 
use his IP and to exclude others from having access to it.9 
There are at least two additional advantages to using the basics, besides 
facilitating private ordering and predictability.  First, each substantive area of law 
provides a more informed forum for debate of the issues that arise in that field.  
Courts, for example, should not reach out to “solve” perceived shortcomings in 
antitrust law or contract law through the law of IP, which itself has specific 
statutory components passed to directly reject similar court action in the past.  
Second, as the product of a long history of adjudication, lawmaking, and 
academic debate, each area of law presumably reflects a relatively efficient 
framework and set of principles that is actually workable, having stood the test of 
time.  Such longstanding bodies of law are in contrast to special approaches that 
judges certainly can employ to deal with IP, but that are untested and that might 
simply reflect a particular normative viewpoint that is not satisfied when the well-
established basics are applied.  
Courts who adopt special approaches to address matters at the periphery of 
IP law run the risk of crafting judicial doctrines that inappropriately override well-
established bodies of law that are informed by longstanding judicial and scholarly 
thought and consideration of each area.  Put simply, when considering disputes 
and transactions at the periphery of IP law, courts often take select principles from 
each body of law out of their larger context and legal framework, while ignoring 
other basic features and principles of relevant legal regimes.  For example, the 
misuse doctrine overlooks a number of considerations involving vertical restraints 
                                                 
9 For more on property rule protection of intellectual property and the legislative history 
of the present statutory regimes, see Kieff, supra note 7.  
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of trade that drive the conclusion under antitrust law that few vertical restraints 
are anticompetitive and that many are in fact procompetitive.  Such selective 
picking and choosing not only creates uncertainty, but, as suggested, often gets it 
wrong.  In part, the “basics matter” approach reflects a humility toward the 
complexity and values embodied in each area of law.    
The kind of respect for private ordering associated with fidelity to the 
basics, together with the corresponding benefit of greater predictability, promotes 
the commercialization of IP and the subject matter it protects.  Our approach is in 
contrast to the approaches offered elsewhere by academics such as Baxter, 
Bowman, and Kaplow, who each offer analytical tools that can only be applied ex 
post to evaluate the validity of any particular licensing arrangement, and as a 
result have limited utility ex ante for parties seeking to structure their affairs in a 
mutually-beneficial way.10   
III. THE BASICS  
Antitrust law, IP law, and the general law of property and contracts are 
each very well established disciplines and bodies of law.  To be sure, numerous 
debates exist within each field, and the law continues to develop.  But general 
consensus can be found on the broad legal frameworks of each field and the core 
principles that undergird them.  Although further development within each 
discipline may be advantageous, it will be best realized if reached through a 
debate that is fully informed by all diverse views by occurring within the context 
of the entire field.   
Approaching from the basics embraces these consensus frameworks and 
principles, and affords each area of the law equal dignity.  The “basics matter” 
approach applies each area of the law according to its own terms, and leaves the 
debates within each legal field to be had and resolved within such field.  In other 
                                                 
10 Baxter, supra note 1, would require that the licensing arrangement be confined “as 
narrowly and specifically as . . . technology . . . and . . . administration permit.”  Baxter, supra 
note 1, at 313.  Bowman, supra note 1, would endeavor to determine the extent to which the 
arrangement deals with something that a court later determines to be competitively superior to 
other available options – presumably rejecting the views of parties to the particular arrangement 
under scrutiny who must have elected to enter into it over other options available at the time of 
entering the arrangement.  Kaplow, supra note 1, would examine the ratio between the reward the 
patentee receives if the arrangement is enforced and the monopoly loss that would result.  More 
recently, Carrier, supra note 1, has argued to look even more broadly to ex post data about how 
particular industries have experienced innovation to determine whether it has tended to be driven 
more by competition or by innovation, without even offering devices for measuring any of these 
many factors.   
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words, questions about restraints of trade are left to the field of antitrust law, and 
questions of contract validity are left to the field of contract law.  More to the 
point, focusing on the basics avoids the fashioning of new doctrines within IP law 
that skirt the basics of IP law, antitrust law, or contract law, such as happens when 
some licensing arrangement that does not violate the antitrust laws or that is 
otherwise a valid contract is held invalid as a matter of some form of sui generis 
IP law.   
To help frame the “basics matter” approach, the following discussion 
highlights what we understand to be the basics of each discipline – antitrust law, 
IP law, and the general law of property and contracts.  The discussion is designed 
to be a summary, by nature; and so does not attempt to fully review the entirety of 
each discipline, which in each case fills volumes.  Nevertheless, this summary 
discussion does endeavor to fairly represent the consensus views. 
A. ANTITRUST LAW 
Antitrust law is designed to root out unreasonable restraints of trade and 
transactions that substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.11  
But it is well established that antitrust law does not prohibit market power as 
such.  Nor does antitrust law prohibit a monopoly, if it is achieved by having 
lawfully outcompeted other competitors.  As Judge Learned Hand famously put it, 
“The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned 
upon when he wins.”12  And increasingly, antitrust law takes account of dynamic 
efficiency, as well as allocative efficiency.  Even specific types of conduct that 
are often associated with restraining trade and that partly drove the passage of the 
federal antitrust laws – such as price discrimination, tying, and exclusive dealing 
– are not prohibited in every instance.  Rather, such conduct generally is 
prohibited only to the extent it unreasonably restrains trade.  Indeed, many such 
practices are procompetitive.  The usual test for unreasonableness in this context 
is highly fact-dependent and generally is based on a “rule of reason” analysis as 
opposed to treating such conduct as an antitrust violation per se.13  Furthermore, 
antitrust law generally allows unilateral refusals to deal.14  As Justice Holmes and 
then-attorney Rich also pointed out, it makes no sense to tell a property owner 
                                                 
11 See generally PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:  PROBLEMS, 
TEXTS, CASES 174-250, 447-77, 785-806 (1997). 
12 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
13 For more on the rule of reason generally, see AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 11, at 
203-50. 
14 See generally id. at 663-784. 
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that she can absolutely exclude others on the one hand but that she cannot on the 
other hand be more generous and allow limited access to her property, without 
giving away the entire store.15  Accordingly, restrictive licensing arrangements 
also generally are permitted.16  To use a simple analogy, as a homeowner, I have 
the right to exclude you entirely from my house or to sell you my house, lease you 
a room for a limited period of time, or grant you a limited easement across my 
front yard.  Even though refusals to deal and restrictive licenses might technically 
restrain trade, they do not do so unreasonably and may by procompetitive. 
B. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
Intellectual property law is designed to facilitate the downstream 
commercialization or realization of the protected subject matter.  While 
intellectual property law does positively reward, and thereby encourage, invention 
and innovation,17 it is not adaptable to being finely tuned to this goal.  It is quite 
difficult to figure out how to appropriately reward invention and innovation, and 
it turns out that a great deal of inventive and innovative activity would not be 
predictably responsive to direct rewards.18  In practice, IP law facilitates 
                                                 
15 I suppose that a patentee has no less property in his patented machine than any 
other owner, and that, in addition to keeping the machine to himself, the patent 
gives him the further right to forbid the rest of the world from making others 
like it. In short, for whatever motive, he may keep his device wholly out of use.  
So much being undisputed, I cannot understand why he may not keep it out of 
use unless the licensee, or, for the matter of that, the buyer, will use some 
unpatented thing in connection with it. Generally speaking, the measure of a 
condition is the consequence of a breach, and if that consequence is one that the 
owner may impose unconditionally, he may impose it conditionally upon a 
certain event….  The domination [over a material used in a patented device] is 
one only to the extent of the desire for the [patented device].” 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 519-20 (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted); Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti- Monopoly 
Laws (pt. 4), 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 328, 330 (1942) (citing same and providing English 
translation from Latin for the Justinian Maxim cited by Holmes: “[one] to whom the greater is 
lawful ought not to be debarred from the less as unlawful”).   
16 See generally AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 11, at 413-44, 686-784. 
17 Innovation is a broader term than invention and is generally understood to include the 
downstream dissemination of inventions.  It is sometimes also called commercialization.   
18 For a discussion of the problems with efforts to reward inventive activities, see, e.g., 
CHISUM et al., supra note 3 at 70-72 (reviewing so-called “incentive to invent” theory of patents 
and criticisms thereto); Kieff supra note 7, at 707-17 (reviewing problems with reward alternatives 
to patents).   
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commercialization by forcing parties to negotiate with each other under the threat 
of suits for infringement.19   
IP law recognizes that limiting the property owner’s causes of action to be 
against only those who directly infringe would unduly undermine or even 
eviscerate the role of IP rights in important cases.  As a result, the doctrines of 
indirect infringement – induced and contributory – arose to capture those 
activities that, at the time conducted, clearly cause the same economic effect as 
direct infringement.20  In the patent context for example, by requiring the IP 
owner to prove not only that his IP rights have been directly infringed by the one 
induced, but also that the alleged inducer intended to induce the infringement, the 
inducement doctrine captures only those who clearly intend to induce 
infringement and who are successful in doing so.21  The contributory infringement 
doctrine operates similarly.  It requires proof of direct infringement and proof that 
the alleged contributor knew that the allegedly contributing conduct was 
“especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement,” although 
broad safe harbor is given to those who provide something that is “a staple article 
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”22  Indirect 
infringement is not accidental.  If so desired, it can be avoided easily through ex 
ante consideration of known patent rights in view of these basic legal rules, which 
are expressly provided by statute and thereby easily knowable.   
The ability of an IP owner to elect to sue or license those who would 
otherwise be guilty of direct or indirect infringement facilitates both price 
discrimination and coordination among complementary users.  For this reason, the 
1952 Patent Act expressly provides – and, indeed, this was a major impetus for 
the writing of the Act – that neither efforts to price discriminate nor the granting 
of a restrictive or unrestrictive license to a potential infringer shall constitute 
misuse.23  This provision was ignored by many courts until the 1980 Dawson 
                                                 
19 For a thorough model of the commercialization goals of IP law, see Kieff, supra 
note 7.   
20 For an overview of contributory and induced infringement and their history in the 
patent context, which is representative for the rest of IP, see, e.g., Giles S. Rich, Infringement 
Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 476 (1953).   
21 See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(inducement of patent infringement requires proof of both intent to induce and actual direct 
infringement by the one induced) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)).   
22 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (contributory patent infringement).   
23 See Kieff, supra note 1, at 736-38.  Before the 1952 Act, courts had used the misuse 
doctrine to erode the ability for intellectual property owners to price discriminate or engage in 
restricting licensing.  Section 271(d) expressly states that such conduct shall not be misuse.   
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decision,24 which finally recognized its impact.  To be certain this was clear, 
Congress acted again in 1988 by adding subparts 4 and 5 to Section 271(d) of the 
Patent Act to expressly provide that neither a refusal to license nor a tying 
arrangement in the absence of market power is patent misuse.25   
Importantly, because the doctrines of copyright misuse26 and trademark 
misuse27 are based on the doctrines of patent misuse and patent law’s indirect 
infringement, our discussion has focused on patents.  The lessons learned from the 
“basics matter” view of patents are equally applicable throughout IP law.   
Under the basics of IP law, it is clear that contracts facilitating price 
discrimination or imposing restrictions on a licensee are allowed – indeed, they 
are contemplated – at least to the extent they are otherwise properly formed and 
enforceable under the general law of contracts, as explored below.  IP rights only 
give IP owners rights of exclusion, not rights to use.28  The uses to which an IP 
                                                 
24 Dawson Chem. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).   
25 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4-5) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-703, 201, 102 Stat. 4676 
(1988)).   
26 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 
203-4 (3rd Cir. 2003) (noting that although “[n]either the Supreme Court nor this Court has 
affirmatively recognized the copyright misuse doctrine… [t]here is … a well-established patent 
misuse doctrine, and, … other courts of appeals have extended the doctrine to the copyright 
context.”).   
27 See generally Carl W. Schwarz, The Intellectual Property/Antitrust Interface, in 7 No. 
6 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 15 (2000), available at WL 7 No. 6 ANIPLR 15 (copyright 
and trademark misuse are each derived from the law of patent misuse) (citing Juno Online Servs., 
L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (trademark misuse)).  For a review 
of intellectual property misuse including trademark misuse see generally AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE: LICENSING AND LITIGATION 
(2003).   
28 Patents give the patentee the right to restrict use of what is claimed in the patent.  
Copyrights give the copyright holder the right to restrict copying of the creative expression 
embodied in the protected work.  Trademarks give the trademark owner the right to restrict use of 
symbols that are confusingly similar to (and in some cases also those that dilute) the protected 
mark.  For none of these IP systems does the IP right give its holder some affirmative right to use.  
Indeed, rights to use are entirely controlled by other areas of law.  For example, a patent on a drug 
does not allow the patentee to avoid FDA or EPA restrictions on the drug’s use.  Similarly, various 
criminal and other public safety laws would restrict the holder of a patent on a gun’s right to use 
that gun.  See generally F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 
307, 307-08 (2002) (invited symposium piece for National Association of Environmental Law 
Societies annual meeting entitled “Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future,” held March 15-
17, 2002, at Washington University School of Law) (discussing how the right to restrict use 
conferred by IP does not interfere with other restrictions on use).   
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owner can put her IP or the subject matter protected by it is (or at least should be) 
determined by other areas of law.  IP law does not limit the rights of an IP owner 
to use her IP or the subject matter covered by it in any way that otherwise would 
be permissible under other areas of law, including antitrust law, property law, and 
contract law.   At bottom, to afford an IP owner fewer rights to use than an owner 
of tangible property enjoys simply because an IP owner has an express statutory 
right of exclusion conflicts with the basics of IP law.  On the other hand, the 
ownership of IP rights does not magically immunize the owner from whatever 
limitations on use of IP or the subject matter it covers are imposed by other areas 
of law, including antitrust law and the general law of property and contracts.  For 
example, an IP owner’s exercise of his IP rights should (and does) remain subject 
to the antitrust laws, and a restrictive licensing arrangement should not be 
enforced if it is not validly entered into under contract law. 
C. THE GENERAL LAW:  PROPERTY AND CONTRACTS 
Property law and contract law operate to facilitate private ordering, a key 
to commercialization of IP assets.  While property law generally eschews 
restraints on alienation and, through its numerus clausus principle, seems to 
recognize only certain estates in land, these doctrines only operate as default rules 
in practice, and a nearly infinite range of dealings can be carried out through 
contract.29  Moreover, even within the traditional forms of property, transferors 
and transferees have a great deal of flexibility to carve up interests in property 
along the dimensions of time, use, and the number of property owners.30  For 
example, when it comes to real property, highly particularized defeasible fees can 
be created and will be enforced, and a real property owner can create any number 
of leasehold interests in his property.  All of these transactions are, of course, 
facilitated by a general regime of property rule protection, as opposed to liability 
rule protection, for rights in both real and personal property.31   
To be sure, when parties order their affairs through contract, this requires a 
valid contract, which in turn requires compliance with proper formation details, 
such as consideration and no unconscionability.  With very few exceptions, 
contract law does not regulate the substance of the parties’ arrangement, focusing 
instead on the contracting process.   
                                                 
29 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).   
30 Id.  
31 For more on property rules versus liability rules in the context of IP, see, e.g., Kieff 
supra note 7, at 732-33. 
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At bottom, whatever strictures property law and contract law impose on 
private ordering, parties are generally free to order their affairs and to carve up 
rights, duties, and obligations as they see fit.  These basics of the general law of 
property and contracts should extend to the use and licensing of IP rights, just like 
they do to other types of property.  Nothing under property or contract law 
provides any particular reason to be skeptical about IP contracts that facilitate 
price discrimination, exclude certain parties from having access to IP rights, or 
impose restrictions on licensees.  What is more, special approaches to disputes 
and transactions involving IP rights often ignore or intentionally override 
purposeful normative and positive features of antitrust law, IP law, or the general 
law and, in so doing, risk upsetting well-developed frameworks crafted to balance 
a number of competing considerations.  
IV. WHEN APPLIED, THE BASICS SOLVE THE PROBLEM 
Applying the basics to prototypical cases at the periphery of IP law, 
including price discrimination, restrictive licensing arrangements, and suits 
against indirect infringers, provides a set of rules that are useable ex ante by all 
market participants in a way that helps them order their affairs while at the same 
time being fair and efficient.  The “basics matter” approach has important 
normative implications, in that judicial fidelity to the basics ultimately affords 
parties greater freedom and ability to structure their interactions in welfare-
enhancing ways.   
The cases we explore are appropriately viewed as prototypical for several 
reasons.  They involve fact patterns that are representative.  They have actual 
historical significance through their contribution to the case law.  And the primary 
architect of the present patent system – the 1952 Patent Act – wrote a five-part 
series of articles about these cases before drafting the statute designed to 
fundamentally change the way courts applying the law would look to the issues 
raised by the cases.32   
As discussed more fully below, the cases can be fairly divided into two 
sets.  Importantly, a review of both sets of cases shows that the “basics matter” 
approach is not merely a veiled effort to promote pro-patent or pro-copyright – or 
more generally, pro-business – positions.  Rather, the basics framework is offered 
as a coherent approach that more predictably can be engaged ex ante and that 
reflects fidelity to, and respect for, separate areas of the law.  Although we focus 
                                                 
32 See Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws 
(pts. 1-5), 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942).  As suggested supra note 4, this is 
one reason why Rich’s views have been so influential.   
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on patents, since the core features of other areas of IP law largely derive from 
patent law, the basics framework and the essence of the following analysis extend 
to copyrights and other forms of IP as well.   
A. INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT VS. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
The first set of cases involves the tension between indirect infringement 
and indirect participation in a breach of contract.  Indirect infringement may be 
actionable as a matter of IP law, as discussed earlier.  Indirect participation in a 
breach of contract may be actionable as a matter of contract law under doctrines 
such as tortious interference with contract, as in the famous multi-billion dollar 
judgment from the Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co. litigation.33  However, the 
happenstance that a contract relates to patents should not transform interference 
with that contract into patent infringement.  The facts that need to be proven are 
different under these different frameworks.  The potential remedies are different 
as well.34   
Wallace, the classic case of indirect infringement, involved a patent on an 
oil lamp having a new burner, together with a standard fuel reservoir, wick, and 
chimney.35  In the case, a competitor of the patent owner had sold a rival product, 
which included the new burner and other lamp parts but not the chimney.  The 
court reasoned that the defendant had contributed to infringement on the part of 
its customers, because they would inevitably add a chimney.  A judgment of 
contributory infringement makes sense under the “basics matter” approach 
because the intended and actual impact of the competitor’s efforts were to make 
sure that its customers acted in an infringing manner.  Indeed, Wallace is the case 
that gave rise to the entire doctrine of indirect infringement throughout all of IP 
law.   
By way of comparison, if the plaintiff-patentee in Wallace instead had 
entered into arrangements with its customers obligating them to buy chimneys 
from the patentee, the analysis under the basics of IP law would be different.  A 
rival seller of chimneys might be liable for tortious interference with contract, or 
the tying arrangement might violate the antitrust laws.  However, the competing 
                                                 
33 Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.App. 1987).   
34 The transformation of breach of contract into patent infringement is significant.  At 
least one essential difference between patent infringement and breach of contract is that the 
remedies for infringement include a right to exclude (i.e., property rule protection), whereas a 
contract is generally viewed as little more than a promise either to perform or to breach and pay 
actual damages (i.e., liability rule protection).     
35 Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F.Cas. 74 (No. 17,100) (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).   
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chimney seller would not be liable for contributory infringement under the basics 
of IP law.    
The Heaton case is an example of just this type of arrangement.  Heaton 
involved a patentee who sold a patented machine with a label license under the 
patent that restricted the machine’s use to certain unpatented inputs (staples, 
literally) – a tying arrangement – and a defendant who sold competing inputs.36  
The court seemed to reason that by providing its staples for use in the machine, 
the defendant was contributing to breach of the label contract, which had given 
the permission through the label patent license to use the machine.  Once that 
license under the patent was gone, the use of the machine became infringing.  
Rather than sue for interference with the contract, the plaintiff sued for indirect 
infringement of the patent under patent law.  The court decided that the defendant 
was, indeed, committing contributory infringement of the patent.  But this turned 
a case about indirect participation in breach of contract into patent infringement.  
By deciding the case the way it did under IP law, the court in effect extended the 
scope of IP rights.  A collateral consequence of the court’s reasoning in Heaton, 
of course, would be to immunize potentially anticompetitive licensing 
arrangements from the antitrust laws.    
The “basics matter” approach rejects the analysis of Heaton.  Under the 
“basics matter” approach, and as pointed out by Rich, this decision was 
inappropriate because it “transformed the law of contracts into ‘patent law.’”37  It 
may have been appropriate for the plaintiff to consider an interference with 
contract argument, if sufficient facts could be proven to substantiate the claim 
under contract law.38  It may even have been appropriate for the defendant to 
consider an antitrust tying argument, if the case could be proven under antitrust 
                                                 
36 Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (C.C.A. 6 
1896) (opinion by Lurton, C.J.) (also known as the “Button Fastener Case”).   
37 Rich, supra note 32, at 251.  The successful argument in Heaton – offered by Frederick 
P. Fish, founding partner of the law firm formerly known as Fish, Richardson, & Neave, which 
later became the firms of Fish & Richardson and Fish & Neave – held out the sales of the staples 
as proxies, or counters, for measuring use of the patented machine.  They may have been, and such 
an arrangement would likely have been efficient.  But the cause of action against the defendant, if 
any, would then be some form of interference with contract, not patent infringement.  Depending 
on the ultimate interpretation of the label contract, the plaintiff may have had a cause of action 
against the party who was a customer of both the plaintiff and the defendant for both breach of 
contract and patent infringement.   
38 The court opinion suggests there may have been sufficient facts to mount such an 
argument.   
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law.39  By not addressing these contract and antitrust arguments head on, cases 
like Heaton allow parties, and judges, to selectively mix features of various 
bodies of law and to extrapolate from them to forge new hybrid doctrines of law 
that run afoul of the basics of each area.40     
The Supreme Court applied the same approach as Heaton in the A.B. Dick 
case, which involveda patent on a mimeograph machine sold with a label 
restriction limiting the brand of unpatented ink that could be used in the 
machine,.41  As in Heaton, the Court agreed with the plaintiff-patentee in A.B. 
Dick, and held that there was contributory infringement of the patent.  Because 
this was a Supreme Court case, its reasoning had a longer lasting impact in 
pushing IP law in a direction that did not reflect fidelity to the basics.   
The “basics matter” approach rejects the reasoning of A.B. Dick for the 
same reason it rejects the reasoning of Heaton.  Indeed, eventually, these cases 
were effectively overturned.  As Rich pointed out later in his testimony before 
Congress concerning the provisions he drafted on indirect infringement in the 
1952 Patent Act, any effort to follow this body of law “would kill itself in time.”42   
                                                 
39 The court opinion does not discuss these facts, but it is likely there was no evidence of 
market power, which would have been required to mount an antitrust argument.  It is curious that 
the court did not discuss the antitrust argument, because, as Rich pointed out, the opinion was 
written against a background in which antitrust law was recently very active:  “The Sherman Act 
had been passed six years before!”  Rich, supra note 32, at 254 (punctuation emphasis in original).   
40 In many instances, such selective application of the law leads to doctrines, such as 
misuse, that erode IP rights.  In other cases, such as Heaton or those cases in which courts have 
subjected transactions involving IP to less scrutiny under antitrust law, the new doctrines can work 
to expand IP rights.   What is more, in all cases, the courts totally fail to give any meaningful test 
for determining when those IP rights should be so eroded or expanded.  
41 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).   
42 As the Supreme Court later pointed out in Dawson, when he was testifying in support 
of what became Section 271 of the 1952 Patent Act, “Rich warned against going too far [and] took 
the position that a law designed to reinstate the broad contributory infringement reasoning of [A.B. 
Dick] ‘would kill itself in time.’”  Dawson Chem. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 208 
(1980) (citing Hearings on H.R. 3866 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1949) (testimony of Giles Rich)).   
As the Court also pointed out in Dawson, A.B. Dick “was followed by what may be 
characterized through the lens of hindsight as an inevitable judicial reaction.”  Dawson, 448 U.S. 
at 191 (citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) 
(reaching result opposite to A.B. Dick on similar facts involving a patent on a film projector and a 
restrictive label contract limiting use to certain film)).  Compare Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. 
at 519-21 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the patentee should be entitled to capture all the 
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An understanding of the basics suggests why Heaton, A.B. Dick, and their 
progeny were not sustainable over the long run.  The problem is not merely one of 
courts going too far one way (e.g., effectively extending the scope of IP rights to 
anything connected to IP and simultaneously immunizing all transactions 
involving IP from serious antitrust scrutiny) or the other (e.g., eliminating the 
doctrine of indirect infringement, thereby eroding IP rights).  The problem is more 
fundamental.  Namely, cases like Heaton and A.B. Dick ignore the basics of each 
implicated body of law – IP law, antitrust law, and the general law of property 
and contracts.  As a result, they lack coherence and, in the name of IP law, 
encroach upon the boundaries of other well-established bodies of law that reflect 
more nuanced and time-tested doctrines and rules that have staying power and 
that are perfectly capable of resolving the disputes on their own terms.     
B. INFRINGEMENT UNDER IP LAW VS. SUI GENERIS LAW 
The second set of prototypical cases involves the question of what body of 
law should govern determinations of infringement: the body of organic IP law – 
patent, copyright, or trademark – or some special sui generis body of law.  In 
many of the cases involving charges of indirect infringement and misuse – which 
are admittedly somewhat difficult doctrines – too many courts and commentators 
have ignored the basics and instead tried to re-hash the normative case for IP to 
develop new specialized approaches in these doctrinally difficult cases that they 
hope will get IP scope just right.  The fundamental problem with these specialized 
approaches is that they re-cast the entire legal institutional framework for IP in a 
way that has pernicious ripple effects throughout IP law by ignoring the many 
choices that have been made over IP law’s development.   
                                                                                                                                     
market generated by the invention and expressing concerns about the transactions that had been 
entered in reliance on the rule of A.B. Dick).   
The law continued to fluctuate after Motion Picture Patents.  In United States v. United 
Shoe Machinery, 247 U.S. 32 (1918) (“Shoe Machinery I”), a case also argued for the patentee by 
Frederick P. Fish, the Court returned to reasoning similar to that in A.B. Dick to permit a complex 
leasing arrangement.  Soon thereafter, the Clayton Act was passed, in part, in response to cases 
like A.B. Dick and Shoe Machinery I, and its Section 3 was directed to sales and leases of articles 
of commerce “whether patented or unpatented.”  15 U.S.C. § 14.  Not surprisingly, in United 
States v. United Shoe Machinery, 258 U.S. 451 (1922) (“Shoe Machinery II”), the Court found 
that the leases violated the Clayton Act.  Similarly, in International Business Machines Corp. v. 
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (“IBM”), the Court found a set of complex leasing 
arrangements accompanied by sales of punch cards to violate the Clayton Act.   
This brief review of the evolution from A.B. Dick to IBM is provided here only for 
historical context.  A significantly more complete treatment is provided in Rich, supra note 32, at 
241-283.   
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One basic trap into which these courts and commentators have fallen when 
adopting such sui generis approaches to IP is focusing on the wrong party when 
considering whose behavior should matter in cases of possible indirect 
infringement.  The behavior of the putative indirect infringer to facilitate or 
encourage direct infringement is relevant to the analysis under both inducement of 
infringement and contributory infringement.  The behavior of the patentee – in the 
sense of the patentee engaging in conduct that leverages his IP rights with the goal 
of extracting value – is not relevant to inducement or contributory infringement.  
Indeed, in such instances, the patentee is simply exercising his rights to exclude 
and to use, as the basics of IP law and the general law anticipate.  Put simply, the 
question of a putative defendant’s infringement should not turn on whether or not 
the patentee was trying to get as much out of the patent as possible through some 
restrictive licensing arrangement, tie-in, or otherwise.  If the patentee, or any 
property owner for that matter, behaves in a way that antitrust law or contract law 
properly prohibit, then that is a matter of antitrust law or contract law.   
 The modern trend towards sui generis analysis of infringement – as 
compared with an analysis based in IP law – has its most visible roots in the 
Supreme Court’s Leeds & Catlin decision.  Just like the classic indirect 
infringement case of Wallace, discussed previously, Leeds & Catlin involved a 
patentee’s competitor selling something that had no substantial non-infringing 
use.43  In Leeds & Catlin, the defendant-infringer sold specially grooved records 
that could only be used in a patented record player known as a “Victrola.”  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that the defendant’s selling of the records was 
infringement because the records were the “distinction [or key element] of the 
invention.”44  This reasoning is entirely flawed.   
Although the “basics matter” approach might reach the same result – a 
finding of contributory infringement – it would do so for an entirely different 
reason than offered by the Court.  Under the basics of patent law, there is no 
“distinction,” or key element, of subject matter claimed under the patent.  The 
patent system operates using what is known as “peripheral claiming” – as distinct 
from “central claiming” – in which the function of the patent claim is not to set 
forth the heart of the protected subject matter but rather to set forth its outer 
bounds.45  Direct infringement is measured against these outer bounds.  Indirect 
                                                 
43 Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co. 213 U.S. 325 (1909).   
44 Id. at 335. 
45 For more on peripheral claiming, see F. Scott Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, 
in F. SCOTT KIEFF, PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 135 (2003).  
A determination of infringement under a central claiming system requires the court to determine 
the heart of the invention and whether the putative infringement is close enough to that heart to 
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infringement is premised upon some occurrence of direct infringement.  But the 
reach of indirect infringement does not turn on whether the putative defendant is 
targeting some key element of the claim.  Rather, as discussed earlier, for a proper 
analysis of contributory infringement under the basics, a key question is instead 
whether there were any substantial non-infringing uses for the grooved records.  
Because there were no such uses in Leeds & Catlin, and because the other 
elements of contributory infringement were established (i.e., direct infringement 
and knowledge of the patent), applying the basics would have resulted in a finding 
of contributory infringement.   
Hanging determinations of indirect infringement on the factors outlined 
earlier in our discussion of the basics – such as intent for induced infringement 
and absence of non-infringing substitutes for contributory infringement – may 
seem like an effort to exalt form over substance.  After all, the reasoning the 
Court adopted in Leeds & Catlin seems to strike at the heart of substance by 
focusing on the key element.  But the Court fails to give any instruction on how to 
determine which element is key, and neither has any other court or commentator.  
The tests for indirect infringement have the essential advantage of being 
comparatively easy to administer.  They look to facts well within the control of 
the putative infringer and are strongly biased in favor of the putative infringer in 
the types of errors one would expect the tests to generate.  The intent requirement 
under an inducement analysis and the broad and readily identifiable safe harbors 
under a contributory analysis ensure these important biases and that the doctrines 
are easy to administer.    
Importantly, the improper reasoning of the Court in Leeds & Catlin is not 
mere harmless error.  The approach courts – especially the Supreme Court – adopt 
matters, even if the results are the same in a particular case.  By suggesting in 
Leeds & Catlin that the case turned on the heart of the invention, the Court 
advanced a line of precedent that focused on the wrong issues in patent cases.  
One of the most pernicious cases in this line of precedent was Carbice, in which 
the Court denied relief to a patentee after reasoning that the patentee was trying to 
                                                                                                                                     
justify a judgment of infringement.  A determination under peripheral claiming requires the court 
to determine only the outer bounds of the claim.  Anything within those bounds infringes and 
anything outside does not.  The so-called “doctrine of equivalents” that exists under the present 
patent system, even though not provided for in the statute, is an odd exception to the peripheral 
nature of our present peripheral claiming system because it allows the patentee to capture 
something outside of the claim.  Although some commentators like this doctrine because it gives 
some flexibility, they fail to see how the patentee can achieve this same flexibility in a manner that 
is not only less costly to the patentee but also to all third parties by simply drafting a better patent 
disclosure at the outset.  F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and 
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2003).  
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extend the patent beyond the key elements of the claim.46  The plaintiff-patentee 
in Carbice had a patent on a packaging method using dry ice.  What troubled the 
Court was that the patentee had a practice of entering into licensing arrangements 
obligating the licensee to use only certain containers for packaging products with 
the dry ice. 
The facts of Carbice are somewhat similar to those of Leeds & Catlin with 
one important difference:  the defendant sold a product – dry ice – that was a 
staple article of commerce usable in many non-infringing manners other than in 
the patented ice-cream packaging.  The “basics matter” approach would again 
yield the same result as the Court’s analysis – in this case, no contributory 
infringement – but again for a different reason.  Instead of focusing on the 
patentee’s alleged extension of the patent beyond its key elements, the “basics 
matter” approach would turn on the many non-infringing uses for dry ice.  As 
Rich emphasized, it is the behavior of the putative contributory infringer that is 
relevant to a determination of contributory infringement, not that of the 
patentee.47  Under the “basics matter” approach it makes sense that the organic IP 
law – in this case patent law – has evolved to focus on the behavior of the putative 
infringer precisely because it is comparatively easy to judge.   
Furthermore, an IP holder should not be denied relief for contributory 
infringement – or even direct infringement – simply because the IP holder is 
exercising his rights to exclude and to use through a tying arrangement or 
restrictive license.  Such conduct is properly a subject for antitrust law and 
contract law, but should have no bearing on a court’s analysis of indirect (or 
direct) infringement under patent law.  Courts should not recast such conduct as 
an effort by the IP holder to “extend” his patent rights for the purpose of 
transforming a matter for antitrust and contract law into a matter for some new 
and contrived version of IP law.   
To be sure, the Court did not always reach the right result, as it did in 
Leeds & Catlin and Carbice.  Because the Court continued to misplace its focus 
on the putatively key elements of patent claims , by the time of the Mercoid cases, 
the entire doctrine of indirect infringement had been almost entirely eliminated as 
                                                 
46 Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931).  A similar approach 
was followed in Lietch Mfg. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (also known generally as 
“Barber”) (Brandeis, J.) (patentee “attempting… to employ the patent to secure a limited 
monopoly of unpatented material”).   
47 Rich supra note 32, at 345 (describing the opinions of the Court in Carbice and Barber 
as revealing “a very significant preoccupation by the Court with the objective of the plaintiffs 
rather than with the doings of the defendant”) (emphasis in original).  
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a result of judicial reasoning that precluded any action for indirect infringement.  
In essence, because its nature every indirect infringement case involves a 
defendant who is not triggering at least one element of the patent claim – direct 
infringement occurs when all elements are satisfied – the focus on “key element” 
in Court’s reasoning allowed every putative indirect infringer to argue that the 
missing element was the one that was “key” and therefore no action for indirect 
infringement could lie.48   
In response, Rich drafted what became Section 271 of the 1952 Patent Act 
to statutorily overrule cases like Mercoid and to revive indirect infringement.49   
Under this established basic framework of patent law after the 1952 Act, the 
essential inquiry for indirect infringement is on the comparatively easy to 
administer framework discussed earlier.    While it may be appropriate to debate 
the benefits and costs of allowing actions for indirect infringement, the above 
review is designed to show at least two important things.  First, sui generis 
attempts to re-hash the proper scope of an organic IP right when addressing cases 
of misuse or indirect infringement will yield a test that is comparatively more 
difficult to administer, that eliminates the doctrine, or both.  Second, unlike prior 
approaches commentators have offered for addressing issues at the periphery of 
IP law – many of which urge a nearly impossible ex post balancing of dynamic 
and allocative efficiency that inappropriately emphasizes reward to inventers as 
opposed to commercialization – the “basics matter” approach provides a set of 
clearer rules and doctrines that market participants can better rely on ex ante in 
structuring their affairs.  
C. OTHER PERNICIOUS RIPPLE EFFECTS  
The “basics matter” approach has important implications for resolving 
matters involving at least two current and controversial issues found at the 
                                                 
48 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (“Mercoid I”), 
and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (“Mercoid II”) 
(patent on new furnace stoker switch).  The same approach was used earlier in American Lecithin 
Co. v. Warfield Co., 105 F. 2d 207 (C.C.A. 7, 1939) (also known generally as “Warfield”) (patent 
on use of lecithin as an emulsifier in chocolates to improve its properties by, for example, 
preventing “whitening” after only a few days). 
49 See, e.g., Dawson Chem. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 214 (1980) 
(“Respondent’s method of doing business is thus essentially the same as the method condemned in 
the Mercoid decisions, and the legislative history reveals that § 271(d) was designed to retreat 
from Mercoid in this regard.”).  Section 271 achieved this result by codifying in subsections (a), 
(b), and (c) those acts that would constitute direct, induced, and contributory infringement, 
respectively; while at the same time codifying in subsection (d) that it would not be misuse for a 
patentee to sue or license anyone who could be sued under subsections (a), (b), or (c).   
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periphery of IP law:  patent and copyright misuse and restrictive licensing 
arrangements.50  Applying the basics today to these and other tough cases that 
simultaneously implicate IP law, antitrust law, and contract law avoids a host of 
pernicious ripple effects – namely, undercutting innovation and the 
commercialization of IP – that arise from more specialized approaches to disputes 
and transactions involving IP.   
Concerning the misuse doctrine, the “basics matter” approach is not 
compatible with the Federal Circuit’s present view of patent misuse, which seems 
to leave a broad and vaguely defined space for misuse.51  In Virginia Panel, the 
Federal Circuit suggested the following test for determining whether a patentee 
has misused his patent:  “[w]hen a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse is 
neither per se patent misuse nor specifically excluded from a misuse analysis by 
Section 271(d) [of the Patent Act], a court must determine if that practice is 
reasonably within the patent grant.”52  But importantly, the patent statutes make 
no provision for per se misuse.53  [Rather, Section 271(d) provides specific safe 
                                                 
50 Although properly a topic of a separate paper because of the many complex approaches 
the Court has taken on it, the doctrine of preemption is another of the serious pernicious ripple 
effects caused by approaches that ignore the basics.  In essence, the preemption cases can 
generally be “seen as efforts to place limits on the ability for [IP owners] to avail themselves of 
various State laws.” CHISUM ET AL. supra note 3 at 1155.  See generally id. at 1155-96 (reviewing 
preemption).  This makes no sense because the IP rights confer rights on IP owners, not additional 
restrictions.  For more on the conflict between preemption and the basics of IP law, see F. Scott 
Kieff, Pretend Preemption: The Supreme Court & IP, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2004) (invited piece for symposium entitled “The United States Supreme Court’s Effect on 
Intellectual Property Law This Millennium” at William Mitchell College of Law held April 24, 
2004).   
51 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Court has jurisdiction over most 
appeals in patent cases.  See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, P.L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(Apr. 2, 1982) (creating a uniform forum for patent appeals in the Federal Circuit by merging the 
Court of Claims with the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and transferring to the new court 
jurisdiction over appeals from patent cases that were tried in the district courts).  Patent   cases for 
purposes of making this jurisdictional decision are those in which the well-pleaded complaint 
alleges a claim arising under federal patent law.  Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 
Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, (2002).   
52 Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (internal 
citations omitted).     
53 According to the Federal Circuit in Virginia Panel:   
The courts have identified certain specific practices as constituting per 
se patent misuse, including so-called “tying” arrangements in which a patentee 
conditions a license under the patent on the purchase of a separable, staple good, 
see, e.g., Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942), and arrangements in which 
a patentee effectively extends the term of its patent by requiring post-expiration 
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harbors for conduct that is not misuse.  Further, it is a misnomer to suggest that 
some use of a patent is not within its scope, since patents only give a right to 
exclude.  The right to use is derived from sources external to IP law.   
If the basics are applied, other bodies of law, such as antitrust law, provide 
the proper legal lens through which to inspect a patentee’s use of a patent and the 
subject matter it covers, especially when it comes to putative misuse, the basic 
thrust of which is that an IP holder should be denied relief for infringement when 
he has used his IP in some allegedly anticompetitive way.  As discussed earlier, 
patentees and copyright holders, like other property owners, are subject to 
antitrust law, because patents and copyrights give only a right to exclude, not a 
right to be free from the constraints of other laws.  In brief, the pernicious effect 
of the misuse doctrine is that it erodes IP rights, at least at the margin, and risks 
rooting out procompetitive and competitively-neutral behavior that the antitrust 
laws recognize as such and permit.54  If the antitrust laws are too lax, the 
appropriate remedy is to fix the antitrust laws.  As Rich pointed out in 
commenting on the unfortunate habit of courts to treat potential antitrust concerns 
as some how more serious and in greater need of policing when IP is involved:   
The patent right is not the only form of property subject to such 
misuse.  But it is so little understood, as compared to other forms 
of property, that much mystery attaches to it and much confusion 
surrounds it.  . . .  [Practices that restrain trade are] not due to the 
patent law . . . .  [They are] due to failure to enforce the anti-
monopoly laws.  The advocates of reform would do well to restrict 
the attack to the latter aspect and not confuse the issue by abortive 
attempts to emasculate the patent law . . . .55 
                                                                                                                                     
royalties, see, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). Congress, 
however, has established that other specific practices may not support a finding 
of patent misuse. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & 
Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 202 (1980) (construing earlier version of § 271(d)).  A 
1988 amendment to § 271(d) provides that, inter alia, in the absence of market 
power, even a tying arrangement does not constitute patent misuse. See 35 
U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994) (added by Pub.L. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676 
(1988)). 
133 F.3d at 869 (internal citations shortened).   
54 For an expanded discussion of this point in the context of copyright misuse, which 
derives from patent misuse, see Paredes, supra note 3. 
55 Rich, supra note 15, at 245.   
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Concerning restrictive licensing arrangements, the “basics matter” approach 
suggests that courts should generally enforce restrictive licenses involving IP as 
long as they are enforceable under contract law and do not run afoul of the 
antitrust laws.  Indeed, affording IP holders the right to carve up interests in their 
IP and the subject matter it covers is consistent with the basics of property law 
and the right to use enjoyed by owners of tangible property.  Courts adopted the 
“basics” reasoning in considering the validity of restrictive licenses of copyrights 
in the ProCD56 case and of patents in the Mallinckrodt case.57  Even when a 
potential or actual IP owner tries to extract payments for activities that fall outside 
the protection of IP,58 courts should enforce these contracts to pay as long as the 
arrangement – which may amount to little more than an effort to ease either the 
risk burden or the financial liquidity burden of the transaction – is properly 
enforceable under contract law.59  By way of contrast, courts that do not stick to 
                                                 
56 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (non-commercial use restriction 
in shrink-wrap copyright license for computer program held valid and enforceable as a contractual 
limit on use).   
57 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (single use restriction 
in label license held valid and enforceable limit on grant of authority so that unauthorized acts may 
support suit for infringement).   
58 For example, the payment may be for an activity that is not protectable by IP generally, 
happens not to have been protected by any particular piece of IP, or was formerly protected by 
some particular piece of IP.   
59 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority of the Court, even allowed a promise to 
pay royalties to reach activity that was never patented so long as at the time the contract was 
executed it reflected both parties’ reasoned assessment of the likelihood and payoff of the different 
states of the world under which patent rights might or might not materialize.  Aronson v. Quick 
Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (contract to pay royalty on a technology was enforceable even 
though no patent ever issued on the technology where at the time the contract was entered into the 
technology might have been patented and the contract provided a low royalty rate for the case where 
no patent issued and a higher rate for the case where a patent did issue).  To be sure, there 
nevertheless remains deep skepticism in the courts towards contracts that happen to be tied to royalty 
payments beyond patent term, even though the economic justification for this skepticism is lacking.  
See, e.g., Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc. 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (discussing at 
length the strength of the reasoning of the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Brulotte v. Thys 
Co., 379 U.S. 29, 34 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting), but nonetheless following the majority opinion 
in that case in refusing to enforce a properly formed IP licensing contract – indeed, a settlement 
agreement from prior litigation – among commercial parties simply because some payments 
happened to extend beyond patent term at the request of the licensee).   The case at the root of this 
line of precedent, Brulotte, involved a patentee who sold a hop-picking machine to farmers and who 
had several patents that would be infringed by such a machine.  The machines were not sold for a 
simple one-shot price.  Instead, payment was to be made over time and based on the actual economic 
advantage the machine generated for the farmer over alternative hop-picking approaches.  Because 
this meant that payment would extend beyond the last of the patent terms, the Court held the contract 
to be unenforceable beyond that term in an opinion written by Justice Douglas, who was well known 
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the basics will often err by finding that restrictive licensing arrangements, 
including tie-ins, constitute some sort of impermissible extension of IP rights.    
V. CONCLUSION 
Our conclusions are mostly modest.  Like the Supreme Court in Dawson 
and earlier work by commentators such as Baxter, Bowman, Gordon, Kaplow, 
Meurer, Lunney, and Rich, we strike a balance between a view of IP that is too 
restrictive and one that goes too far.  But following more closely the writing of 
Rich, who after all drafted the statutory framework that Congress adopted for 
patent law, we look not only to the direct impact that applying the basics at the 
periphery of IP law has on the commercialization of invention.  We separately 
believe that it is important to respect the different legal institutional frameworks 
of the various bodies of law that are involved – IP law, antitrust law, and the 
general law – each of which strikes its own balance among the competing needs 
of those who interact with these disciplines.  Although in practical terms, the 
“basics matter” approach often reaches results that are similar to the outcomes of 
other approaches, we provide a normative justification for a positive law 
framework that is more predictable and that captures the distinct and important 
balances that are struck within each separate body of law that is implicated.   
We offer, in the end, a framework for understanding IP law and the 
broader interfaces that IP law shares with a number of bodies of law, such as 
antitrust law, property law, and contract law.  Our framework is in large part 
animated by a property rights perspective that places priority on ensuring the 
appropriate ex ante incentives to facilitate the complex transactions needed to 
ensure wider use of the subject matter IP rights cover, such as through 
information dissemination and commercial sales of embodiments.  Our 
framework is equally motivated by attention to the basics of each other body of 
law we discussed with an understanding that only through coherent discussion of 
each area in a piece-wise fashion can the right progress be made on both positive 
law and normative fronts.   
                                                                                                                                     
for his dislike of patents.  In dissent, Justice Harlan pointed out that this holding would make 
unenforceable deals that were actually advantageous to farmers who either were liquidity constrained 
at the time of purchase or who were skeptical of the economic value of such capital equipment.   
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Finally, the “basics matter” approach reflects a general skepticism about 
courts’ ability to make ex post determinations regarding how to facilitate the 
complex commercialization process that must occur for the public to derive the 
benefits of the various works protected by IP rights.  Put differently, we believe 
that private ordering and markets are more effective than courts, all things 
considered, at solving what at bottom are industrial organization matters.  
* * * * * 
